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A persuasive theoretical justification for extending foreign assistance to developing 
countries was provided by the now famous ‘two gap’ theory. It proclaimed that these countries 
might not in general be able to achieve a target rate of growth because of persistent balance of 
payments problems and a paucity of investable funds. Both these problems could be dealt with 
simultaneously by an injection of resources from overseas in the form of foreign aid. An 
implication of the two gap theory was that foreign aid would be complementary to domestic 
saving effort: it will raise investment by providing additional resources, and also increase saving 
by raising the level of income through the multiplier process. However, a number of studies have 
found that instead of supplementing domestic saving, foreign aid has actually supplanted it in 
many countries. One explanation, which has attracted some attention, is that by making resources 
easily available, foreign aid permitted a relaxation in saving effort and encouraged an increase in 
consumption. This paper takes the view that the observed inverse relationship between foreign aid 
and domestic resource mobilization could be also explained in terms of an entrepreneurial 
constraint. Many developing countries like Bangladesh suffer from an acute shortage of 
entrepreneurial skill. Given the existing stock of entrepreneurial skill, these nations are unable to 
invest any more than a small proportion of their income. Injection of foreign material and 
technical aid is, therefore, unlikely to be fully reflected in an increase in investment; part of it will 
actually replace domestic private investment. This paper develops a theoretical framework to 






A well-known hypothesis spawned by the voluminous literature on the problems of 
development in low-income countries in the post-Second World War years is that investment 
in these countries is constrained by their limited capacity to save. This is enshrined in both 
the ‘vicious circle of poverty’ theory and the ‘two-gap’ theory espoused by Chenery and 
Strout (1966). According to the former, poverty is both a cause and consequence of poverty.
1 
Poor countries with limited capital stock can save very little, as their incomes are barely 
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enough to ensure subsistence needs. Low savings imply a low level of capital accumulation 
in these countries. This in turn implies that productivity of labor stagnates at the low level 
such that incomes remain low. They are, therefore, trapped in a vicious circle of poverty that 
can be broken only by some exogenous interventions. The ‘two gap’ theory states that 
investment effort in poor developing countries in the early stages of development is limited 
by two constraints.
2 First, these countries may be unable, perhaps due to poverty, to save 
sufficiently from current income to provide for investment needed to achieve a target rate of 
growth. Investment (and output growth) could also be limited by the unavailability of 
sufficient amounts of imported inputs due to a balance of payments constraint. The paucity 
of both saving and foreign exchange (to pay for imported materials) could be overcome by 
an inflow of foreign aid. By providing additional resources, aid would raise investment 
beyond the limit of domestic saving. The latter could also rise as the realized incremental 
investment raises d omestic output through higher productive capacity as well as the 
multiplier effect in the case of underutilized capacity. This was, and continues to be, one of 
the most forceful arguments in favor of a continued flow of foreign aid to developing countries. 
Although very persuasive, there are at least two empirical facts that are difficult to 
explain by either of these theories. First, if poverty were the real cause of low saving, it 
would be paradoxical that some of the poorer developing countries actually save and invest 
much larger proportion of their incomes than some of the more affluent countries. As Table 1 
shows, Pakistan’s per capita income was about 17 per cent higher than that of China and 35 
per higher than that of India at the beginning of the eighties. And yet Pakistan’s saving ratio 
during that time was only 40 per cent of China’s and 59 per cent of India’s saving ratio. 
Kenya’s per capita income was twice the per capita income of India, but its saving ratio was 
less than three-quarters of that of India. Even starker is the case of Haiti, Sierra Leone and 
Somalia, all of which had a per capita income higher than that of India and comparable to 
China. But the saving ratios of these countries were hardly one-fifth of the saving ratio of 
China and j ust over one-quarter of that of India. If poverty were the only, or even the 
dominant, cause of low saving these findings would be difficult to rationalize.
3   
Furthermore, there is some evidence that some developing countries actually save less 
when they become relatively more affluent. Kenya, Sierra Leone and Somalia in Table 1 fall 
in this category. An interesting example that is of some interest to this paper is the case of 
Bangladesh. It had a respectable saving ratio when it was a part of Pakistan, but soon after 
independence its saving ratio declined dramatically to only 1.02 of GNP (in 1975). It rose to 
3.92 per cent in 1980 but fell back to around 2 per cent for the rest of the decade. If poverty 
were the dominant cause of low savings, one must wonder how the country had saved about 
8 times more during the sixties than it had in the recent years when the per capita income 
was significantly higher. 
 
2. See Chenery and Strout (1966). 
3. Lewis was also very skeptical that low income was responsible for low saving in the developing c ountries. He 
argued forcefully that “No nation is so poor that it could not save 12% of its national income if it wanted to: 
poverty had never prevented nations from launching upon wars, or from wasting their substance in other ways.” 
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The second empirical fact that casts some doubt on these theories is the finding by a 
large number of authors that in many countries aid flows seem to be inversely related to the 
domestic saving ratio.
4 If investment in developing countries were really constrained by an 
incapacity to save a substantial fraction of their meager income, then an increase in aid flow 
should fully raise investment. The consequent increase in income should also be conducive 
to an increase in the saving ratio. Hence, what one expects to find is a complementary 
relationship between foreign aid and domestic saving. But the studies mentioned above 
actually indicate a substitute relationship between aid and saving. Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven 
and Solimano (1992) report finding of a recent study by P. Boone that for a sample of 82 
developing countries whose aid receipts are less than 15 per cent of GNP, all aid is spent on 
consumption (p. 100). Contrary to the implications of the two-gap theory, a part (sometimes 
a large part) of the foreign aid receipts actually financed consumption rather than investment 
in many developing countries, and had a negative effect on domestic saving.
5 
This paper contends that the apparent conflict between the empirical findings 
mentioned above and the theories which regard saving effort to be the only, or the dominant, 
constraint on investment arises because of the inadequate attention to entrepreneurship as a 
vital ingredient of investment. It is interesting that Chenery and Strout did mention 
entrepreneurship as a crucial input in the productive process and foresaw that a shortage of 
entrepreneurial skill could limit investment. However, they did not include entrepreneurial 
skill in the formal modeling presumably because they regarded this to be of lesser 
importance than the other two constraints. The role of entrepreneurship in development is 
usually underestimated so much so that it hardly ever merits more than a cursory mention in 
much of the literature.
6 This paper negates this attitude and emphasizes its central role in 
investment and growth of the economy.
7 Specifically, it demonstrates that, contrary to the 
general perception,  it is the level of investment that limits saving  in some developing 
countries such as Bangladesh.
8   
 
 
4. See for example, Rahman (1967) and Weisskopf (1972). 
5. A more worrisome aspect of foreign aid is that it does not foster growth in the overwhelming majority of the 
developing countries (Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven and Solimano (1996)). An inverse relation between saving and 
growth also exists for Bangladesh. However, this is not the focus of this study. 
6. Among the notable exceptions are Leibenstein (1968) and Schumpeter (1934). 
7. Griffin and Enos (1970) also emphasize the critical role of entrepreneurship in the development process. They 
categorically state that “…  growth ultimately depends less on expanding development finance than on developing 
a vigorous, local, private and public entrepreneurial group.” For a similar argument see chapter 5 in Kalecki 
(1976). 
8. Sundrum (1990) argues “…  savings do not depend only on incomes but, as Lewis himself has argued, on the 
opportunities for profitable investment. Without such opportunities, rising incomes are mostly spent on 
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II. Model 
 
When we look at the process by which national output is divided between various 
claimants, it should be apparent that saving is unlikely to be a dominant constraint on the 
modest rate of investment that occurs in many developing countries. The first call on the 
national output is made by the government; and its share need not be limited by any 
underlying propensities of the private sector. Whatever remains after the government has 
taken its bite is divided between consumption and investment. Consumption spending is 
dependent upon current income of the consumers, but investment decisions are taken 
independently of current income of the firms.
9 They are based more upon expectations of 
future profits. The actual act of investment is normally undertaken with bank loans rather 
than profit income of investors. This implies that investment decisions of firms are made 
independently of the saving decisions of households. 
This should not be construed to mean that the amount of investment actually 
undertaken in an economy could diverge from saving. This is, of course, not possible ex post 
in an closed economy since the total output net of government spending must be divided up 
between consumption and investment, implying that ex post investment must equal ex post 
saving in each period. However, the demand for investment need not equal desired saving. If 
there is a discrepancy, relative prices and output will change to bring about the equality 
between the two. It is important to understand the process by which any discrepancy between 
the two is resolved in the market place. Suppose, under current market conditions, the 
demand for investment is less than desired saving. At the aggregate level this implies an 
excess supply condition which would tend to reduce output and prices, particularly the 
interest rate. The reduction in the interest rate would stimulate investment demand while the 
reduction in output would tend to reduce saving such that the equality between saving and 
investment is ultimately restored. However, if the interest rate is repressed or already very 
low in real terms (the liquidity trap syndrome) as is the case in many developing countries, 
the interest rate mechanism in the adjustment process does not work. With investment 
demand exogenously determined, the onus of adjustment in this situation falls on output 
which contracts and thus brings about the necessary reduction in saving (recall the paradox 
of thrift). It is also possible that finding their saving effort frustrated, households may reduce 
their propensity to save. Whichever is the case, saving would adjust to investment.
10 
If investment demand is greater than desired saving under the existing conditions, the 
aggregate demand for output exceeds the supply. This excess demand will force up the prices 
and output. If the interest rate were market determined, it would also rise which would 
dampen investment demand to some extent. But when interest rate is repressed, this is 
prevented from happening. The market restores balance through changes in output and price 
only.  An increase in output increases the supply of saving. An increase in price also 
 
9. Consumers in developing countries are usually liquidity constrained. They are thus prevented from maintaining a 
smooth consumption profile as implied by the life cycle theory. Current consumption is ‘excessively’ sensitive to 
current income.   
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contributes to augment saving. Inflationary price rise usually redistributes income in favor of 
the wealthy at the expense of ordinary fixed income wage earners. To the extent the former 
has a higher propensity to save than the latter, saving would rise. Perhaps more important is 
the impact of the so-called inflation tax. A price hike at a given level of real income and 
interest rate increases the demand for nominal money. In order to replenish the 
inflation-eroded stock of money, households and firms are forced to ‘buy’ additional cash 
with temporary excess saving. Total saving rises and the gap between saving and investment 
is reduced and ultimately eliminated. Therefore, when interest rate is not fully flexible what 
seems plausible is that saving would adjust to, rather than constrain, investment. 
A number of reputed economists have recognized that saving cannot possibly constrain 
investment as argued in this paper. For example, Keynes stated categorically that “[t]he 
investment market can become congested through shortage of cash. It can never become 
congested through shortage of saving. This is the most fundamental of my 
conclusions …”(1939, p. 572, emphasis added). However, he did not regard entrepreneurship 
to be a scarce factor. His reasoning was based on the multiplier analysis. Any new 
investment will increase income by an amount necessary to generate sufficient saving to 
match the incremental investment. He argued  “Increased investment will always be 
accompanied by increased saving, but it can never be preceded by it.  … It is the parent not 
the twin of saving.
11 Lewis (1982, pp. 105-6) held a similar view that “[t]he saving ratio is 
not an obstacle.  … In a mature economy, productive investment gets the first call on savings, 
in the sense that entrepreneurs can always raise the money needed for finance productive 
investment,” The view of this paper is the same in this respect; however, it probes further 
why new investment may not occur even when profitable opportunities exists. 
Private investment is undertaken by private entrepreneurs. Investment in the public 
sector also requires a modicum of entrepreneurial quality if it is to be efficient. This paper 
explicitly recognizes the role of the entrepreneur in all branches of business operation such 
as planning, production and  marketing. However, to keep the analysis simple, the 
contribution of entrepreneurship is captured through its effect on production. Entrepreneurial 
and organizational skill is included in the production of function as an important argument.
12 
Output,  q , produced by a firm, therefore, depends on both the capital stock,  k , and labor, 
l , employed for current production as well as the business skill of the entrepreneur, 
) ; , ( : e l k q q e =  where  . 0 > e q  In principle, entrepreneurs could be hired. But in practice 
there is seldom any market for entrepreneurship in developing countries because of the 
monumental moral hazard and adverse selection problems that arise due to the poor quality 
of information and the difficulties of contractual enforcement. Hence entrepreneurship may 
be regarded as nontradeable. It must be provided by the owners of, and utilized in, the firm. 
For any firm the skill of its entrepreneur is given, and hence, the production function above 
reduces to the standard production function of the neoclassical analysis. The former is 
assumed to exhibit the same properties as the latter. Furthermore we assume that 
0 , , > ee le ke q q q , i.e., marginal products of all inputs increase  with an increase in the 
 
11. Keynes (1937, p. 669). 
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entrepreneurial skill. Profit earned by the firm,  , P  is : , ) ; , ( wl rk e l k pq - - = P where  p 
is the price of the output,  r  is the rental cost of capital and  w  is the nominal wage rate. 
Profit maximization by the individual firm implies: 
 
0 = - r pqk , 
0 = - w pql , 
   
where the subscripts denote first partial derivatives. These two well-known first order 
conditions that the value marginal product of each input is set equal to its price may be 
solved for the  input demand functions:  ) ; , , (
* * e w r p k k =  and  ). ; , , (
* * e w r p l l =  
Assuming that the output price, rental cost of capital and wage rate remain constant we may 
shorten the input demand functions and write,  ) (
* * e k k =  and  ). (
* * e l l =  The demand for 
labor and capital stock are functions of entrepreneurial skill alone. Under the assumptions 
made above it can be easily shown that an increase in entrepreneurial skill will increase the 
desired capital stock,  . 0 /
* > de dk
13 To derive the investment demand of the firm it is 
assumed that when the actual capital stock is less than  ,
* k  the firm invests in order reduce 
or eliminate the discrepancy between the actual and the desired capital stock,   
 
), (
* k k i - =a     , 1 0 £ <a                                             (1) 
 
where  i  is the level of investment and a is the adjustment factor which depends, among 
other things, on the costs of adjustment. Assuming these costs to be constant we may rewrite 
Equation (1) as 
 
), ( ) (
* e i k k i = - =a    and  . 0 > ¢ i                                       (2) 
 
Investment of each firm is determined, ceteris paribus, by the amount of entrepreneurial 
input it possesses.
14 Summing over all firms, the total investment demand of the economy, 
, I  can be expressed as 
 




e i I i                                                     (3) 
 
where the subscript  j  identifies the firm. Let us assume that it is possible to aggregate over 
entrepreneurial skill of all firms and express Equation (3) as  
 
 
13. The standard results that an increase in output price and wage, and a reduction in rental cost raise the desired 
capital stock also hold.   
14. A similar result is also obtained by the more rigorous Jorgenson procedure to derive investment functions: Max 
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), (e I I =     . 0 > ¢ I                                                   (4) 
 
where  e is the some measure of aggregate entrepreneurial skill. Just as the demand for 
investment of the individual firm is limited by the skill of its entrepreneur,  the total 
investment demand of the economy is limited by the total availability of entrepreneurial skill 
in the economy. Since, in the aggregate saving equals investment, this implies that a country 
with limited entrepreneurial talent cannot increase saving, even if it wanted to, beyond that 
implied by the aggregate investment function above.
15 In such a situation saving will be 
constrained by investment. As entrepreneurial talent tends to be scarce in the early stages of 
development, poor countries are likely to have a low saving ratio not because they cannot 
save more, but mainly because they cannot profitably invest more. 
The analysis above assumed a closed economy. To explain why foreign aid may 
reduce saving let us take a close look at the national income accounting identity for an open 
economy, 
 
CAD S I ” - ) (e ,                                                     (5) 
 
where  I  is gross domestic investment,  S  is gross national saving and CAD is the current 
account deficit. To maintain balance of payments in balance, CAD must be matched by an 
equal amount of capital inflow, KAS (capital account surplus). If there is no private foreign 
investment in or out of the country then  A KAS CAD ” ”  where  A is the foreign aid 
inflow. We can split up  I  into government and private investment and rewrite Equation (5) 
as 
 
A S I I p p g g = - + ) ( ) ( e e ,                                               (6) 
 
where the subscript  g  and  p stand for government and private sector respectively.  g e  is 
the amount of entrepreneurial skill absorbed by the government sector and  p e  that 
remaining for private investment. 
In order to undertake investment projects for which resources have been made 
available by foreign aid, the government must find people with sufficient entrepreneurial and 
organizational skill. They could, in principle, be hired from overseas. If we rule out this 
possibility then they must be attracted form the existing pool of entrepreneurial talent. 
Aid-financed projects may be lucrative (as they are in Bangladesh) in which case they would 
draw away entrepreneurs from less lucrative private ventures. Foreign aid opens up many 
rent-seeking trading opportunities with the prospect of very high profits, but which require 
very little social investment.
16 Entrepreneurs currently engaged in less profitable businesses 
 
15. If the residents of the country are permitted to invest their savings overseas, this constraint is not binding. 
However, many developing countries including Bangladesh impose stringent controls on private capital 
outflows. 
16. There could nonetheless be substantial private investment by aspiring entrepreneurs who may have to spend 
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as well as potential entrepreneurs may be enticed into these quick profit ventures leaving 
fewer entrepreneurs for the private sector.
17 If we retain the assumption of a fixed stock of 
entrepreneurial skill, the increased government investment will draw away entrepreneurial 
skill to the public sector equal to what the private sector loses.
18 Taking the differential of 
Equation (6) we get, 
 
g g p p d I dS dA d I e e ¢ - + = ¢ ,                                             (7) 
 
where a prime denotes the first derivative of the function. Utilizing the condition that 















¢ + - ¢ =                                             (8) 
 
The first term on the right side is the increase in government investment due to a dollar 
increase in foreign aid. By assumption, the magnitude of this term is at most unity. The 
second term in parentheses is obviously greater than unity. Hence, an increase in aid flow 
reduces national saving. 
It is likely that a unit of entrepreneurial skill would organize a larger volume of 
government investment than private investment. The penalty of business failure in 
government enterprises being minimal, the management may spend more freely than an 
entrepreneur in the private sector. This would make  g I¢  greater than  p I¢ . Let  g p I I ¢ = ¢ l  
where  . 1 0 £ < l  Then Equation (7) reduces to 
 








l                                             (9) 
 
As long as  , 1 < l  foreign aid substitutes for national saving only partially. Ironically, the 
smaller the value of  l, i.e., the more inefficient the public sector, the less would be the 
substitution of national saving by a given amount of foreign aid as fewer entrepreneurs will 




The main argument of this paper is that a developing nation’s capacity to invest is 
limited by its entrepreneurial stock. A lack of sufficient investment in turn may restrict 
domestic saving should ex ante saving exceed investment. Hence, a more intense saving 
 
large sums of money in perks and grafts to local and foreign officials to get a share of the aid money. 
17. The proliferation of NGO activities does not leave any room for doubt that entrepreneurs are enticed into 
aid-induced activities. For the purpose of this paper NGO activities could be included in the public sector.   
18. Management skill could also be subsumed under the rubric of entrepreneurial skill.   JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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effort alone is unlikely to raise the level of gainful investment and saving. Any direct test of 
this hypothesis is not possible since entrepreneurship is not an observable variable. One 
could perhaps construct some proxies, such as the educational qualifications of the 
entrepreneurs or their business experience, but these would be open to analytical criticisms 
and also run into data problems. An indirect test that is only suggestive is reported below. 
The theory outlined above implies that an increase (decrease) in entrepreneurial skill would 
lead to a rise (fall) in investment and hence, saving.
19 If we can find countries that had a 
sudden change in the amount of entrepreneurial skill, that would offer an opportunity to test 
the theory. A reduction (or increase) in entrepreneurial skill should be accompanied or 
followed by a decline in investment and saving ratios if the hypothesis is correct. Two 
countries, viz. Bangladesh and Uganda, offer such an opportunity for an indirect test of the 
hypothesis. 
At the time of the liberation war in 1971, the entrepreneurial class in Bangladesh 
comprised mostly people from the then West Pakistan and refugees of Non-Bengali origin 
who steadfastly sided with (West) Pakistan in their atrocious war against the Bengalis. 
Almost all of these entrepreneurs were either expelled or fled the country when Bangladesh 
emerged as a sovereign nation on December 16, 1971. This created a huge shortage of 
entrepreneurial skill leading to a chaotic situation in the business sector that wreaked havoc 
in the national economy. Such a shortage of entrepreneurial skill also meant that the capacity 
of the country to invest was severely limited. Investment declined very markedly after 1971 
as shown in Table 2.
20 Domestic saving declined even more precipitously as the greater part 
of investment of the country was financed by a generous inflow of foreign aid that made 
domestic saving  largely redundant. The country still suffers from a shortage of 
entrepreneurial skill.
21 Investment and saving are, therefore, still pitifully low. 
 
Table 2  Investment and Saving Ratios of Bangladesh and Uganda 
  Bangladesh  Uganda 
Year  Investment Ratio  Saving Ratio  Investment Ratio  Saving Ratio 
1970  17.40  16.65  13.83  17.02 
1971  8.23  3.79  15.16  11.26 
1972  4.7    ꎭ3.36  10.97  13.43 
1973  8.71  3.40  8.20  11.39 
1974  7.37  0.73  10.68  10.38 
 
19.  An exception to this would b e the case where the government assumes the responsibility of investment in 
infrastructure, public utilities and business. However, if the public sector is not endowed with committed 
entrepreneurial management people, such investment would be inefficient. The capital -output ratio would tend 
to be high and productivity low. A high rate of investment and saving would not lead to a high rate of 
productivity and growth.   
20. The unstable political condition, no doubt, also contributed to the lack of business investment during the initial 
years. What is suggested here is that saving and investment declined more than what could be attributed to 
political instability.   
21. This is now being increasingly recognized in the country. TASLIM AND WELIWITA: THE INVERSE RELATION BETWEEN SAVING AND AID 
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Table 2  (Continued) 
  Bangladesh  Uganda 
Year  Investment Ratio  Saving Ratio  Investment Ratio  Saving Ratio 
1975  6.15  0.94  7.61  5.47 
1976  9.91  ꎭ2.98  5.55  6.79 
1977  11.52  6.18  7.78  2.88 
1978  11.54  1.62  6.39  8.20 
1979  11.20  1.52  6.05  ꎭ0.42 
1980  14.87  2.11  5.62  ꎭ0.37 
1981  15.90  3.44  7.34  1.01 
1982  15.30  1.06  8.91  3.87 
1983  13.36  1.20  7.56  5.35 
1984  12.22  1.64  7.62  5.88 
1985  12.78  1.88  9.78  6.92 
1986  12.28  2.39  11.64  6.09 
1987  12.53  3.58  10.46  3.91 
1988  12.03  2.80  10.19  2.23 
1989  12.23  1.99  11.21  ꎭ0.88 
1990  12.08  2.20  12.01  ꎭ1.18 
 
The government of the other country, Uganda, headed by Idi Amin, started a campaign 
in the early seventies to expel from the country people of Asian origin who held British 
passports. Asian business people at that time comprised a large proportion of the Ugandan 
entrepreneurial stock. Their expulsion must have caused a sudden depletion of this stock. 
The country’s capacity to invest, therefore, also declined. As shown in Table 2, Uganda’s 
investment ratio started a downhill slide at about that time. By 1977, it declined to about 
one-quarter of its level in 1972. The decline in investment went hand in hand with a 
sustained decline in domestic saving. 
A more rigorous test of the model is performed with aggregate time series data of 
Bangladesh covering the period 1959-60 to 1994-95. As mentioned earlier, the country is 
believed to suffer from a shortage of entrepreneurial skill. Given that such skill is a limiting 
factor, there is a maximum amount of investment that can be made efficiently in any period. 
This amount can be financed from domestic saving and/or foreign aid. An increase in aid 
will displace some domestic saving if unaccompanied by at least a  proportionate rise in 
entrepreneurial skill.
22. Therefore, domestic saving may be inversely related to aid in such a 
situation. On the other hand, if aid supply remains constant, but the entrepreneurial stock 
increases with an increase in profitable business opportunities, investment will rise and the 
incremental investment will be financed by an increase in domestic saving. In this case there 
would be a direct relationship between domestic saving and investment.
23 
 
22. It is assumed that the capital-output ratio does not change. One of the ways unprofitable investment would show 
up is an increase in the capital-output ratio without any increase in labor productivity. 
23. If the country permits free flow of capital, incremental saving need not bear any relationship to incremental 
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The standard consumer theory suggests that income is one of the most important 
determinants of household saving. In consideration of this and what has been discussed 
above, we posit the following linearized behavioral relationship: 
 
t t o t t t u GDI k Aid c GDP b a GDS + + + + = 0 0 0 ,                              (10) 
 
where GDS = gross domestic saving, GDP = gross domestic product, GDI = gross domestic 
investment,  Aid = foreign aid disbursement,  u is a random error term and t is the time 
subscript. If the hypothesis advanced above is correct, the expected sign of  0 b  and  0 k  is 
positive while that of  0 c  negative for a country with a limited entrepreneurial stock. Thus 
the significance of  0 c  and  0 k  provides a test of the hypothesis.   
Data on these variables for the pre-independence period 1959-60 to 1969-70 have been 
adopted from Alamgir and Berlage (1974). Post independence data were gleaned from 
various issues of Economic Trends (Bangladesh Bank) and Statistical Yearbook (Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics). Since no reliable data exists for the period 1970-71 and 1971-72, that 
includes the liberation war, these years were dropped from the analysis. In interpreting the 
results the problems of missing observations should be borne in mind.
24 
Estimation of Equation (10) in levels suffers from a serious shortcoming. An OLS 
regression in levels could give spurious results since all the variables in the equation are 
generated by time series processes. To guard against this problem, it is necessary to test for 
the stationarity of the variables. Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test was performed on GDS, 
GDI, Aid and GNP in both levels and first differences. The results are presented in Table 3.   
 
Table 3  ADF Test Results 






GDSt  ꎭ0.77  ꎭ0.91  ꎭ4.68
**  ꎭ4.99
** 
GNPt  2.21  ꎭ0.11  ꎭ2.63
*  ꎭ3.35
* 










- - + + + = D =
m
j
t j t t t Y Y Y in H tests ADF
1
1 0




j t t t t Y Y Y in H tests ADF m r l d q d ￿
=
- - + + + + = D =
1
1 0
2 0 :                                   (2) 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 95, and 90 percent levels, respectively. The critical values for the 
ADF test can be found in MacKinnon (1991). Optimum lag length (m) in the ADF equation was chosen based on 
the Akaike’s Final Prediction criterion. 
 
investment.   
24. The results obtained from the estimation of Equation (10) with only post-independence data are qualitatively 
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These clearly show that all the series have unit roots. To confirm these findings, we also 
performed the Phillips-Perron tests (Phillips (1988) and Phillips and Perron (1988)). These 
results are presented in Table 4. Although half of the Phillips-Perron test statistics indicate 
that Aid and GNP are stationary, the other statistics show they have unit roots. For GDS and 
GNP, all the test statistics except one,  )), ( (( 1 f Z  show that they have unit roots. Based on 
these tests we conclude that all the variables are first difference stationary. Hence, the 
cointegration approach is appropriate for estimation of the coefficients. 
 
Table 4  Phillips-Perron Test Results 
Variable  ) ~ (a Z   ) ( ~ a t Z   ) ( 3 F Z   ) (
* a Z   ) ( * a t Z   ) ( 1 F Z  
GDSt  1ꎭ9.65  ꎭ1.97  12.61  ꎭ8.65  ꎭ1.75  11.65 









*  ꎭ2.51  ꎭ1.06  11.33 
Notes : Testing for the presence of a unit root with Phillips-Perron tests (Phillips (1988) and Phillips and Perron 





t t t Y Y e a m + + = -   and                                                             (3) 
 




1 t t t Y
T
t Y e a b m + + - + = -                                                            (4) 
 
where  *
t e  and  t e ~  are error terms and  T  is the sample size. Using the regression results of (3) and (4), we 
compute the following test statistics: 
 
(1) 1 : ) ( *
0
* = - a a H Z in (3),  (2) 1 : ) ( *
0 * = - a a H t Z in (3), 
(3) 0 : ) ( *
0 1 = - F m H Z and 1
* = a in (3),  (4) 1 ~ : ) ~ ( 0 = - a a H Z in (4), 
(5) 1 ~ : ) ( 0 ~ = - a a H t Z  in (4),  (6) 0
~ ~ : ) ( 0 3 = = - F b m H Z and  1 ~= a in (4). 
 
In each case, the  0 H  that  t Y  has a unit root is tested against the alternative that  t Y  is stationary. Since 
these statistics are asymptotically equivalent to the corresponding Dickey-Fuller tests, the critical values from Fuller 
(1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1981) can be used in testing. * denotes statistical significance at the 95 percent level. 
 
The Johansen and Juselius maximum likelihood method is utilized to test for the 
presence of cointegration between the variables in Equation (10). This is the preferred 
method since it is capable of identifying all cointegrating relationships in a multivariate 
context. Within this contex t Equation (10) could be written in the first difference vector 
autoregressive form: 
 
t k t k t k t t t X X X X X e + P - D G + + L G + D G = D - - - - - - 1 1 2 2 1 1 L     ) ,..., 1 ( T t =           (11) 
 
where  X  is a column vector of the endogenous variables and  i G ’s are the parameter 
vectors. This equation differs from the standard VAR model by the presence of the last term JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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that is in levels rather than in first difference. This term contains information about the long 
run equilibrium relationship between the variables in  . X  If the rank of the  P matrix  r  is 
, 0 m r < <  then there are two matrices  a and  b  each with dimension  r m ·  such that 
. ' P = ab  The number of cointegrating relationship among the variables in the vector  X  is 
given by the value or  . r  The matrix  b  contains the elements of  r  cointegrating vectors 
and has the property that the elements of  X ' b  are stationary. The error correction 
parameters that measure the speed of adjustment in  X D  are represented by the vector  . a  
Before Equation (10) is tested for cointegration, the optimum lag length for the 
variables (i.e.,  k  in Equation (11)) should be determined. To do this, the procedure outlined 
in Haffer and Jansen (1991) is adopted. Firstly, Equation (11) is estimated as an unrestricted 
model with  k  arbitrarily set equal to 5. The unrestricted model is then tested against a 
restricted model with  4 = k  by a likelihood ratio test (distributed as 2 c with 16 degrees of 
freedom in this case). The test was conducted sequentially by reducing the lag length by one 
each time. The procedure was repeated until the restriction could be rejected at 5% 
significance level. The value of  k  in the unrestricted model, when the restriction is rejected, 
is taken to be the optimum lag length for the model. The optimum lag length thus found for 
Equation (11) was 4. Having determined the optimum lag length we performed the trace test 
and the  maximum eigenvalue test for the presence of cointegrating vectors. Both tests 
indicated the existence of only one cointegrating vector at the 5% significance level. The 
cointegrating vector normalized on GDS is presented in Table 5. While the coefficients of 
GNP and GDI are positive, that of  Aid is negative. All the coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1% level. A highly significant negative coefficient of Aid suggests that aid and 
saving in Bangladesh bore a long run inverse relationship. 
 
Table 5  Johansen-Juselius Cointegration Tests 
Trace Test  Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
0 H   0 H  
0 = r   111.56
*  0 = r   56.97
* 
1 £ r   154.59
*  1 = r   36.57
* 
2 £ r   118.02
*  2 = r   14.44
* 
3 £ r   113.57  3 = r   13.57 
Cointegration Vector Normalized on GDSt 












Critical Values for Trace Test 
 
Critical Values  
for Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
0 H   95%  99%  0 H   95%  99% 
0 £ r   47.21  54.21  0 = r   27.07  32.24 
1 £ r   29.68  35.65  1 = r   20.97  25.52 
2 £ r   15.41  20.04  2 = r   14.07  18.63 
3 £ r   13.76  16.65  3 = r   13.76  16.65 
Notes: Critical values for the Trace test and the Maximum Eigenvalue test are from Table I, Osterwald-Lenum 
(1992). Figures in parentheses are standard errors. * indicates statistical significance at the 95 percent level. TASLIM AND WELIWITA: THE INVERSE RELATION BETWEEN SAVING AND AID 
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Next, the direction of causality between saving and investment was examined by 
estimating an error correction model. The hypothesis we tested was that (due to the shortage 
of the entrepreneurial stock) investment was the limiting factor that constrained saving. This 
implies a causality running from investment to saving. On the other hand, if saving were the 
limiting factor, as believed by many, causality would run the other way. In a more mature 
economy one would expect a bi-directional causality. We tested this hypothesis by 
estimating an error correction model that involved regressing the first difference of GDS on 
the current and lagged first differences of all the explanatory variables, lagged values of 
GDS D  and one period lagged residuals from the cointegrating regression. Granger causality 
implies that as long as two or more variables are cointegrated, a causality will exist in at least 
one direction. Testing for Granger causality requires testing whether the coefficient of the 
error correction term is significantly different from zero. Even if the coefficients of the 
lagged terms are not significant, G ranger causality still exists as long as the adjustment 
coefficient is significantly non-zero (Choudhry (1995)). An important matter is the choice of 
the appropriate lag length used in the error correction model. Hendry’s general to specific 
modeling strategy (Gilbert (1986)) is followed for this purpose. Error correction models with 
three lags in each variable were first estimated. The non-significant terms were then removed 
to obtain a more parsimonious model. The estimates of the error correction models are 
shown in Table 6. One model had  GDS D  as the dependent variable while the other had 
GDI D  as the dependent variable. The statistical fit of both models was good with high 
R-squares. The F-test clearly rejected the non-significance of all the regressors in each model. 
Several diagnostic tests were conducted to check for the robustness of the models and 
functional stability. These tests did not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, no 
ARCH effects, no functional misspecification, homoscedsticity, and the normality of 
residuals. CUSUM tests were employed to test for parameter stability. In both cases, the 
plots for the tests showed that at 5% level of significance the boundary lines were not 
breached, suggesting the absence of structural breaks during the sample period. The 
coefficient of the error correction term was significant only in the model with  GDS D  as the 
dependent variable implying that causality existed only in the direction from investment to 
saving. The significance of the error correction term suggests that ignoring the cointegrated 
nature of the relationship would lead to a misspecification of the dynamic relationship. 
 
Table 6  Error Correction Model Regression Results 















(ꎭ2.60)   
ꎭ0.24 
(ꎭ1.24)   
t GDS D  
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Table 6  (Continued) 
Variable  Dep. Variable = t GDS D           Dep. Variable = t GDI D  
GNP D  
 









(ꎭ2.23)   
ꎭ0.07 
(ꎭ0.45)   






  -   
1 - D t GDI  
 
  -   
ꎭ0.43
* 
(ꎭ2.35)   





(ꎭ3.51)    -   










2 - D t AID  
 
  -   
ꎭ1.20 
(ꎭ1.92)   
3 - D t AID  
 
  -   
ꎭ0.74 
(ꎭ1.34)   
Diagnostic test statistics for  t GDS D  
68 . 0
2 = R   6 . 12 10 = Q   34 . 9 = F   04 . 5 1 = Z   71 . 0 2 = Z   0 . 0 3 = Z  
64 . 1 4 = Z   19 . 14 5 = Z          
Diagnostic test statistics for  t GDI D  
65 . 0
2 = R   5 . 3 10 = Q   47 . 4 = F   80 . 0 1 = Z   05 . 0 2 = Z   45 . 1 3 = Z  
63 . 0 4 = Z   57 . 19 5 = Z          
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 95 percent level. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.  1 - t EC  is one 
period lagged error correction term,  10 Q  is the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation, F-test tests the 
null hypothesis that all regressors as a group, except the constant, have zero coefficients,  1 Z  is the 
Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality,  2 Z  is the Breush-Godfrey test statistics for first order serial 
correlation,  3 Z  is the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic for first order ARCH residuals,  4 Z  is the 
Ramsey’s RESET for functional misspecification and omitted variables (degree one), and  5 Z  is the White 
test for heteroscedasticity. 
 
The findings of the empirical analysis lend some support to the hypothesis advanced in 
the paper. The coefficient of the aid variable is negative and statistically highly significant. 
The magnitude of the coefficient of Aid in the long run cointegrating relation does raise some 
concern. It indicates that every dollar of aid coming into the country has depressed domestic 
saving by about twice that amount. Even if all aid were spent on consumption the coefficient 
should have been insignificant. Such a large value could be possible if aid had led to 
widespread rent-seeking and significant distortions in the economy. Casual observation 
would tend to support such a view. 
The inverse relation between saving and aid was found to be a very robust relation that TASLIM AND WELIWITA: THE INVERSE RELATION BETWEEN SAVING AND AID 
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held for several different specifications of the saving equation and for different sample sizes 
(although the coefficients differed in magnitude). There seems little doubt that aid had a 
large negative influence on saving in Bangladesh during the study period, and consequently 
did not significantly promote investment. It is, therefore, not surprising that aid has not 
played much of a positive role in the economic development of the country. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
The inverse relation between saving and aid is well  known in the literature. The 
arguments advanced to explain this phenomenon are usually based on such subjective factors 
as a lack of effort, government imprudence and profligacy due to an easy access to foreign 
saving. This paper suggests that a recognition of entrepreneurship as an important input in 
business can provide an additional/alternative explanation of why some countries show a 
relaxation of saving effort with an increase in foreign aid inflow. Effective utilization of such 
aid in these countries requires a concerted effort to develop local entrepreneurial and 
organizational talent. Domestic resource mobilization will no doubt substitute for, and reduce 
dependence on, foreign aid; but it may not raise investment unless the supply of 
entrepreneurship rises simultaneously. This appears to have been the case in recent years. At 
the behest of the donor agencies, the government made more earnest effort to raise domestic 
saving. The saving ratio rose, but the rise only compensated for the reduction in aid receipts 
as shown by the scissors shaped graph in Figure 1. Investment did not show a sustained 
increase. 
It has been suggested that entrepreneurial talent in the early stages of development 
tends to be concentrated in only a handful of labor-intensive low-skill industries like 
garments the products of which are exported mostly to developed countries due to a lack of 
effective demand at home.
25 Hence, one of the way of quickly developing entrepreneurial 
skills in developing countries is to encourage the growth of such industries.
26 This requires 
not only appropriate domestic policies as emphasized by multilateral organizations, but also 
an international trade regime that permits the products of these industries to enter the markets 
of the developed nations relatively freely. The greatest harm that can be done to the 
development of entrepreneurship in, and the economic growth of, the poor countries of the 
world is the imposition of protective tariffs or non-tariff barriers by the rich nations. Indeed, 
freer access of products of poorer nations into the markets of the developed nations could 
substantially reduce the need for foreign aid of the former and hence, lessen the budgetary 
burden of the latter. 
 
 
25. See Taslim (1995). Lall also sates that:  “Where  there is a modicum of skills,  …  simple labour-intensive 
activities will start …”  (1996, p. 117). He further suggests that these skills need to be nurtured and improved 
upon, perhaps with government help, if more advanced business opportunities are to be exploited. 
26. It may not be a mere coincidence that the East Asian NICs had a relatively free access to western markets in the 
early stages of development when they were producing mainly labor intensive low skill products. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Table 1  Investment and Saving Ratios of Selected Countries (per cent) 























Nepal (US $150)  05.89  04.02  09.15  06.25  15.53  009.84  22.59  013.84  18.18  009.30 
Bangladesh (US $170)  17.40  16.65  08.09  01.02  16.34  003.92  12.78  001.88  11.80  001.92 
India (US $260)  17.40  16.65  20.83  19.40  23.60  020.14  25.60  022.47  23.17  020.39 
Sierra Leone (US $280)  16.90  12.11  15.92  04.56  01.70  ꎭ0.32  10.14  008.91  11.46  005.07 
Somalia (US $280)  11.72  06.60  18.23  04.15  16.09  004.01  26.31  ꎭ12.14  15.50  021.51 
China (US $300)  28.50  28.71  30.33  30.56  30.63  029.55  38.68  034.46  39.08  042.61 
Haiti (US $300)  06.51  03.76  14.88  05.58  14.20  005.44  14.38  006.12  10.93  001.09 
Pakistan (US $350)  15.79  08.97  16.06  05.87  16.35  011.86  18.63  006.39  18.64  011.54 
Kenya (US $420)  25.33  20.65  18.87  09.97  30.00  014.96  26.50  025.40  23.67  018.43 
Uganda   13.83  17.02  07.56  05.33  06.10  ꎭ0.40  10.05  007.89  12.25  ꎭ0.70 
Source: World Bank (1992), World Tables. 